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‘The elephant in the room’ no more: Europe as a structuring line of political 
cleavage in the 2017 presidential election  
 
Emmanuelle Schön-Quinlivan 
 
Abstract: 
It is traditionally argued that the topic of European integration is rather absent or 
under-discussed in the French political debate. In this context, it came as a 
surprise that the 2017 French presidential election turned into a ‘référendum sur 
l’appartenance à l’Union’ (Costa, 2017). This article argues that after many 
presidential campaigns where Europe remained ‘the elephant in the room’, 2017 
saw its settling as a clear line of cleavage between political parties, relegating the 
traditional left/right cleavage to a secondary position. The politicisation of socio-
economic questions at European level also signalled a move away from the 
traditional value-based Eurosceptic grounds towards a will to shape the debate 
towards a more social Europe.  
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Introduction 
 
It is traditionally argued that the topic of the European Union (EU) and European 
integration is rather absent or under-discussed in French presidential campaigns 
(Dehousse and Tacea, 2015; Costa, 2017). Yet, institutionally, Europe remains 
within the remit of the President. The lack of politicisation of the Europe issue in 
the French political debate needs to be analysed in parallel with developments in 
the European construction. Authors specialised in European politics have argued 
that the 1992 ratification of the Maastricht treaty marked a turning point with a 
move from a ‘permissive consensus’ to a ‘constraining dissensus’ and a clear 
politicisation of the European issue (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). However, authors 
like Green-Pedersen (2012) emphasise the difference between politicisation of 
Europe in referenda and in national elections with the latter struggling to take off.  
 
In this context, it came as a surprise that the 2017 French presidential election 
turned into a ‘référendum sur l’appartenance à l’Union’ 1  (Costa, 2017). For a 
number of years and despite a tight ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 as 
well as the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, France had witnessed a 
consensus between the dominant centre-right and centre-left political forces on 
the fundamental advancement of the EU project (Drake, 2013, pp. 127-128). Even 
though increasingly apparent lines of fractures were emerging in the socialist 
party and the UMP, officially both parties campaigned in favour of a ‘yes’ to the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Its rejection by 55% of the people and the quick fix 
offered by Sarkozy as he took office in 2007 led to the Lisbon treaty ‘with some of 
the same provisions […] of the rejected constitution’ (Kassim, 2008, p. 276).  This 
                                                        
1 ‘referendum on the EU membership’ 
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push ahead by the political establishment ignoring the clear signs sent by the 
electorate about a European construction which they felt was detrimental to their 
economic situation and their status is evident until 2017.  
 
However the 2017 presidential campaign marked a change. As Reynolds argues 
(2017, p. 128), ‘recognising the mounting scepticism towards Europe alongside 
the seemingly immovable French commitment to the project, no presidential 
candidates saw any real value in prioritising it in their campaigns’. Yet, centrifugal 
forces, namely populism from the left and from the right as well as a new centrist 
pro-European political movement, squeezed traditional political parties out and 
revealed two radically opposed views on the role of France in the EU and the socio-
economic impact of the EU on France. Having been monopolised by the Fillon 
scandal on the accusations of fictitious employment of his wife, the debate turned 
to the issue of Europe only in the latter part of the campaign, with six out of the 11 
candidates in favour of some form of Frexit (Mélenchon – La France Insoumise, Le 
Pen – Le Front National, Dupont-Aignan – Debout la France, Asselineau – Union 
populaire républicaine, Cheminade – Solidarité et Progrès, Poutou – Nouveau Parti 
Anticapitaliste) and four who were critical of the orientation of the European 
project (Hamon – Parti Socialiste, Arthaud – Lutte Ouvrière, Fillon – Les 
Républicains, Lassalle – Résistons!). The politics of fear centred on France’s loss of 
sovereignty, be it economic, monetary or identity-based, as well as a rejection of 
capitalism and the market economy, became very prevalent. On the other side 
stood Macron, the leader of a new political movement, En Marche!, who forcefully 
proclaimed himself pro-European.  
 
Taking the analytical lens of European rejectionism developed by Startin and 
Krouwel (2013) which identifies three motivations for rejecting the EU – values  
such as sovereignty, protest grounded in domestic discontent and ideology driven 
by an anti-liberal sentiment – this article argues that each of the candidates spoke 
to the three categories of rejectionists, politicising the issue of Europe mainly 
through socio-economic issues even when sovereignty was associated with 
regaining economic control. For the first time, Europe was not the underlying 
issue, ‘the elephant in the room’, but became was frontally discussed and debated 
regarding its impact on France and France’s role in it, an inwards/outwards 
double look which each candidate engaged with. Ultimately after decades of 
lukewarm political discourse over the issue of Europe, it was the three radical 
candidates on the topic that monopolised the debate: the pro-European Macron 
and the two Euro-rejectionists, Mélenchon and Le Pen.  
 
This article firstly looks at past presidential campaigns from 1995 to 2012 in order 
to analyse the ways in which ‘Europe remained ‘the elephant in the room’’ 
(Reynolds, 2017, p. 128) for the voters due to the inextricability between France 
and the European Union. It highlights how it is only in 2012 that it can be argued 
that the presidential campaign became ‘Europeanised’ (Dehousse and Tacea, 
2015). Section two moves onto the 2017 presidential campaign discussing the 
ways in which this Europeanisation increased and structured the lines of cleavage 
clearly setting politicisation of the European issue on the basis of France in or out 
of the EU, capable of radically reforming the European treaties or not.  Finally, 
section three concludes by looking at what the 2017 campaign tells us about the 
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future of France in Europe at a time of rising Eurosceptic sentiment across the 
European Union and as the Brexit negotiations are starting.  
 
1995 – 2012: from political party consensus to dissensus, the emergence of 
Europe in the presidential debate 
 
It has been demonstrated that the issue of Europe did not feature prominently in 
the 1995, 2002 and 2007 presidential campaigns but that 2012 represented a 
‘game changer’ (Reynolds, 2017). This is confirmed when looking at the ranking 
of the priorities listed by the electorate at each presidential campaign from 1995 
to 2007. CEVIPOF surveys in 1995, 2002 and 2007 asked the electorate to rank 13 
issues and Europe arrived respectively last, third last and second last. Looking in 
detail at the issue of Europe in the French political debate in a historical context, 
the 1995 presidential campaign took place a few years after the Maastricht 
referendum which sanctioned the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the abandonment of national currencies for the Euro. As pointed out 
by Kassim (2008, p. 267), Chirac became president in 1995 at a time when France 
seemed to have lost influence within the European Union while ‘’Europe’ had 
become a contentious domestic issue.’ The ratification of the Maastricht treaty 
took place through referendum in 1992 and led to an explosion of a dissatisfied 
French public opinion onto the European scene. ‘The Maastricht episode divided 
French public opinion over Europe’ (Sauger, 2008, p. 66) and left long-lasting 
effects regarding Euroscepticism in France. Whereas the referendum route looked 
like a guaranteed success given the polls, political parties such as the Communist 
Party and the Front National but also key political personalities such as the 
gaullists Séguin and Pasqua as well as the socialist Chevènement, campaigned 
against the monetary and economic loss of sovereignty detailed in the treaty. As a 
consequence, following the rejection by the Danish people a few months earlier, 
the French people returned a very small ‘yes’ of 51.04%. Despite this polarisation 
on a central European issue, the 1995 campaign  was marked by the ‘conspicuous 
absence of a serious discussion on Europe’ (Mazey, 1995, p. 146). The mainstream 
parties having campaigned in favour of ratification, they had no appetite to revisit 
this issue and open Pandora’s box.  
 
A similar pattern emerged in the 2002 presidential campaign with the coming into 
force of the Euro earlier that year. There was no discussion about a re-orientation 
of the European project despite the significant protest vote on the extreme Left 
and the extreme Right, with the Front National reaching the second round of the 
election for the first time. Between 1990 and 2002, the proportion of polled people 
who said they would be very relieved if the EU was dissolved went from 6.4% to 
15.3%, a clear sign of rising Euroscepticism (Flood, 2005, p. 44). As a result, the 
mainstream political parties once again stayed clear of the topic during the 
campaign in order to preserve their political capital (Belot and Cautrès, 2004). 
Furthermore, Chirac, who had been criticised for his handling of the French 
presidency of the Council concluding with the adoption of the Nice Treaty in 2000, 
had not managed to relaunch the traditional Franco-German engine of the 
European Union with Chancellor Schroeder (Kassim, 2008). Despite this 
indifference if not distrust of the French opinion towards Europe, Chirac ‘began 
during the course of his quinquennat to express his vision of the EU as a 
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‘federation of nation states’.’ (Kassim, 2008, p. 270) His second mandate was 
dominated by the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty, presided by a former 
French President Giscard d’Estaing. Despite a vigorous pro-treaty campaign, the 
result came back 55% against this new European project.  
 
Given the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French, despite 'the core of 
the Eurosceptics represent[ing] around 25 per cent of the French population' 
(Sauger, 2008, p. 66) and the fears this treaty had generated regarding the impact 
of European integration on France’s economic and social model, Europe would 
have been expected to be a salient issue in the 2007 presidential campaign. Yet 
again, total isolation between domestic politics and European issues happened. 
Sauger (2008, pp. 71-72) gives three reasons to explain this watertight boundary 
between national and European issues. Firstly, he points out that Europe was not 
a structuring cleavage the same way the left/right divide traditionally is. Secondly, 
there was an overwhelming consensus over the issue of Europe among governing 
parties while Eurosceptic parties were kept outside of the Parliament which 
ratifies European treaties. This led to a ‘‘neutralization’ of Europe as a source of 
party division’ (p. 71).  Finally, people in France demonstrated benign indifference 
for European issues which were not considered as significant. This consideration 
of Europe as a secondary issue was comforted by the political elites who 
considered that there was absolutely no political gain in discussing Europe and 
therefore focused on domestic issues, despite those being very often affected in 
one way or another by decisions made at the European level.  
 
2012 is however seen as a ‘Europeanised contest’ (Dehousse and Tacea, 2012) at 
the domestic level and the European level since the key candidates, Sarkozy, 
Hollande, Le Pen and Mélenchon, defined ‘some key features of the policy they 
intended to pursue at European level if they were elected [… while] other member 
states closely followed the campaign [… and] indicated a preference for one of the 
candidates’ (p. 4).  Drake (2013) highlights how salient the candidates’ speeches 
and manifestos had rendered the issue of Europe given the impact of the economic 
crisis. Hutter and Kerscher (2014) demonstrate that the crisis generated an 
increasing politicisation of the issue among French voters. Therefore Sarkozy 
announced his candidacy by setting France in Europe and the world: ‘France 
cannot act as if Europe did not exist […] as if the world did not exist’ (cited in 
Drake, 2013, p. 125). When looking at the IPSOS poll done about ranking the issues 
of concern for the electorate in the 2012 presidential election, Europe did not even 
feature among 16 issues listed.  Similarly, an Opinionway poll done in March 2012 
showed that only 8% of the voters considered ‘la construction européenne’ as 
influencing their choice as opposed to employment with 42%.  
 
However, this low ranking of Europe among the concerns of the voters in the 2012 
campaign, after four years of Euro crisis management carried out by Sarkozy, 
should be read through the prism of France’s deep embeddedness in the EU as a 
founding member state (Reynolds, 2017). None of the economic and social 
consequences could be understood or dealt with at national level. Reynolds (2017, 
p. 128) explains very clearly that Europe ‘is stitched into the very fabric of how 
[France] works and importantly how France views itself’. Even though the 
European Union is not at the origin of 80% of French legislation, it has become 
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‘more of a domestic than a foreign policy issue’ (Rowdybush and Chamorel, 2011, 
p. 170). The 2012 campaign was therefore run mainly on the politicisation of 
Europe on economic grounds rather than identity ones (Hutter and Kerscher, 
2014).  During his campaign, Hollande focused on arguing for a re-orientation of 
the Economic and Monetary Union with the renegotiation of the Fiscal Compact 
Treaty in order to include a Growth and Employment Pact which would counter-
balance the inevitable austerity measures needed to comply with the new treaty. 
Overall, the tone of the 2012 campaign was very critical of Europe. In a similar if 
less aggressive way than the extreme left, Mélenchon, and extreme right, Le Pen, 
the socialist candidate developed an anti-austerity rhetoric, which marked the end 
of the consensus over the advancement of European integration. As argued by 
Reynolds, ‘Europe [has] progressively become increasingly important as an 
electoral issue, rendering its days as the ‘elephant in the room’ very much a thing 
of the past’ (2017, p. 130).  
 
The issue of Europe having become so politicised with increased salience and 
polarisation across the range of French political parties, 2017 tested whether 
‘Europe [had achieved] the status of a cleavage that can disrupt and override 
existing patterns of party support’ (Sauger, 2008, p. 71) based on a primary 
left/right cleavage.  
 
2017: the European Union as the structuring issue of the political cleavages 
 
 Out of the 11 candidates, 10 of whom were either for some form of Frexit or 
extremely critical of the direction of European integration, this article will focus 
on the top four, attracting more than 10% of the votes, namely Macron, Le Pen, 
Mélenchon and Fillon, as well as Hamon as the representative for one of the 
traditional key political forces in the French party system, namely the Socialist 
Party. This section looks firstly at the appetite of voters for non traditional parties 
or what has been labelled ‘anti-system’ candidates in an attempt to solve issues 
which the traditional ‘alternance’ between the conservatives and the socialists 
never fixed. Secondly, taking the lens of EU rejectionism as developed by Startin 
and Krouwel (2013), it analyses how candidates articulated their position on the 
place of France within the EU and the impact of the EU in socio-economic terms 
for France.   
 
From traditional politics to ‘anti-system’ politics: the relegation of the left/right 
divide in favour of a pro/anti Europe cleavage 
 
The issue of Europe featured in eighth position of concern for the French voters, 
at the same level as their pension and the healthcare system (IPSOS, 2017). This 
represents a significant improvement on similar polls done for previous 
presidential election. Nonetheless, it does not reflect the significance that the issue 
ended up having in terms of structuring the debates and the cleavages between 
the candidates. There are two reasons for this situation. The first one is that 
ultimately, the two selected for the second round of the election were Macron and 
Le Pen, the former labelling himself the candidate ‘of the right and the left’ while 
the latter calling herself the candidate ‘of neither the right nor the left’. Both 
candidates clearly rejected this left/right divide to structure their campaign and 
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looked for another line of cleavage which ended up revolving around the EU and 
being the ‘progressistes’ versus the ‘patriotes’. The second reason, as Costa (2017) 
points out, comes from the fact that all the candidates, except for Macron, had 
called for a no vote to the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The rising 
Euroscepticism, which was visible during the 2017 presidential campaign, is not 
restricted to France as the Dutch parliamentary campaign of March 2017 and the 
breakthrough of Geert Wilders highlighted. It also came after the earthquake of 
the Brexit which saw populists like Farage and the UKIP win a referendum to 
extract the UK from the EU. Poland and Hungary have both seen clear anti-EU 
integration governments come to power over the last five years. This rising wave 
of Euroscepticism is the consequence of the increasing success of populist parties 
in Europe, on the extreme-right of the political spectrum mostly, which have been 
getting closer to power.  
 
Two elements seem particularly striking in the 2017 presidential election. Firstly, 
the left/right cleavage was relegated to secondary position and trumped by the 
open/closed or pro/anti globalisation with Europe as the main structuring 
cleavage. The vote for candidates regarded outside ‘the system’ or the traditional 
political parties fostered this de-alignment from a left/right line of fracture. 
However this was also enhanced by 15 years of rising Euroscepticism and lack of 
engagement with European issues by politicians since the razor-tight ratification 
of the Maastricht treaty.  The occurrence of the economic crisis and the deep 
involvement of France in its management changed the centrality and visibility of 
Europe in the political debate while deepening the divisions on its benefits 
(Rozenberg, 2015). Secondly, the 2017 campaign was overwhelmingly run on 
socio-economic issues relating to the European Union. Particularly in between the 
two rounds, the debate focused on the Franco-German engine of European 
integration which Macron wants to relaunch and the regaining of economic and 
monetary sovereignty which Le Pen considers vital. Her alliance with Dupont-
Aignan before the second round crystallised even more attention on her economic 
vision for France the option of a double currency, Franc and Euro. Given the 
minimal results by the previous presidency over the reduction of unemployment 
figures, it might not be surprising that the issues of purchasing power, 
employment and social inequalities monopolised the debate to the detriment of 
values or identity-based arguments.  
 
France in or out of Europe: institutional arrangements between the domestic and 
the European level 
 
Following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France in 2005, 
Startin and Krouwel (2013) identified three types of EU rejectionism. The first two 
types were visible in the no vote to the Maastricht treaty: one is a traditional 
sovereignist and value-based vote which rejects the principle of shared 
sovereignty in the EU and is mostly found on the right of the political spectrum. 
The second one exists in the radical left or right and is not ideologically based but 
represents a protest vote grounded in domestic discontent. The authors consider 
that the rejection of the 2005 Constitutional Treaty has triggered the emergence 
of a third category of EU rejectionists who are ideologically driven, contesting a 
neo-liberal EU which promotes further globalisation. Interestingly those three 
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faces of EU rejectionism are apparent in the 2017 campaign, even though Le Pen 
is probably the one candidate who took aspects of each category of EU 
rejectionism to build her manifesto.  
 
Each of the major candidates spoke to at least one of the three categories of Euro-
rejectionist voters. Fillon addressed the concerns of the pro-sovereignists in the 
direct tradition of Gaullism and Seguinism, at the core of the no campaign against 
the Maastricht treaty.  His manifesto called for ‘une Europe souveraine qui 
respecte pleinement les Nations.’ 2  (Fillon, 2017) His view of Europe fits the 
intergovernmental approach (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, 2015) looking to 
reform the European Commission ‘en concentrant l’exercice des compétences 
européennes sur quelques domaines fondamentaux et en appliquant strictement 
le principe de subsidiarité3.’ (Fillon, 2017) The argument focuses on preserving 
French national interests and making sure that only some strategic areas remain 
within the remit of the European Union.  
 
Targeting the third category of rejectionist voters, Mélenchon and Hamon, in two 
different styles and with two radically opposed solutions, criticised the European 
Union for its neo-liberal stance which they argued destroys workers’ protection 
rights and the French social model. Hamon, the socialist candidate opposed 
globalisation with a strong, social and protective Europe. Believing in the founding 
principles of the European Union, he argued that ‘la solution ne peut venir ni du 
retour à des Etats-nations divisés, ni de la poursuite de l’austérité économique et 
de son pendant, le déficit démocratique' 4  (Hamon, 2017). His argument was 
clearly in favour of more Europe, wanting a Europe of energy and a Europe of 
defence as well as a reform of the Eurozone economic governance. Taking the 
criticism of neoliberalism a step further, Mélenchon’s manifesto argued in favour 
of exiting the European treaties through negotiation with the European partners 
of entirely new rules or a unilateral withdrawal from the European Union which 
equates to a hard Frexit. His argument was that ‘notre programme n’est pas 
compatible avec les règles des traités européens qui imposent l’austérité 
budgétaire, le libre-échange et la destruction des services publics’5 (Mélenchon, 
2017). With his radical left-wing manifesto, Mélenchon grounded his rejection of 
the European Union and the Eurozone in a protection of the Nation’s interests 
against wild globalisation.  
 
Interestingly, this ideological grounding also works in understanding Le Pen’s 
approach to the issue of France in Europe. Traditionally the Front National voters 
would have belonged to the second category, protesting against the system, the 
establishment and the government of the day (Startin and Krouwel, 2013, p. 75). 
However the more recent political line followed by Le Pen as advised by her right 
hand man Philippot has brought the party electoral success in traditionally 
                                                        
2 ‘a sovereign Europe which fully respects Nations.’ 
3 ‘in focusing European competence on a few crucial areas and in applying strictly the principle of 
subsidiarity’. 
4 ‘The solution can neither be a return to divided Nation-States nor pursuing economic austerity 
and its consequence, democratic deficit.’  
5 ‘Our manifesto is not compatible with the rules of the European treaties which impose 
budgetary austerity, free trade and the destruction of public services.’ 
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socialist or communist territories such as the North. It has also involved drawing 
from the first category of rejectionism regarding sovereignty issues and the third 
category of rejectionism when it comes to blaming globalisation and neo-
liberalism for the economic difficulties faced by their working class voters. Le Pen 
plays all those cards anchoring her manifesto in the idea of ‘rendre à la France sa 
souveraineté nationale. Vers une Europe des nations indépendantes, au service 
des peuples.’6 (Le Pen, 2017) involving a referendum on exiting the EU and the 
Eurozone. Sovereignty is very much at the heart of her project with a reclaiming 
of the four lost sovereignties ‘monétaire, législative, territoriale, économique’7 (Le 
Pen, 2017).  Weaved into this sovereignty argument is the one on economic 
patriotism which rejects free-trade agreements such as the CETA and 
globalisation.  
 
Finally, Macron, ‘Monsieur Europe’ (Le Point, 2017), ‘à la pointe du combat pour 
la poursuite du projet européen’8 (Quéré, 2017), anchored France’s future and its 
economic success in Europe. Amazingly, given the constant rise of Euroscepticism 
in France, he campaigned on a strong pro-European platform, arguing for further 
integration in the reform of the EMU governance and the relaunch of the Franco-
German engine of European construction. His rallies were notorious for having as 
many supporters waving European flags as there were waving French flags, 
something unheard of in any presidential campaign. He spoke to the non-
rejectionist voters who believed the future of France was in the European Union. 
The specific context of this positioning helped in aggregating some political gain 
on this particular issue even though it had not been the case since 1992. Indeed 
Brexit and the premises of chaotic negotiations focused the minds over what 
exiting the EU really mean and gave Macron and his vision of a protective and 
social Europe some significant traction.  
 
Apart from Fillon, the issue that they all engaged with when discussing the impact 
of the European Union on France is how Europe can economically and socially 
protect workers and citizens or not. Even though Costa (2017, p.4) argues that the 
populist and Eurosceptic candidates ‘[ont] présenté la sortie de l’Union comme un 
événement disruptif susceptible de redonner la parole au ‘peuple’ contre le 
‘système'’9, they moved away from the issue of immigration and identity-based 
arguments against the EU. Socio-economic questions and EMU governance were 
at the centre of the 2017 campaign. 
 
The Europeanisation of socio-economic issues: emerging from domestic discontent 
but looking for a European solution  
 
Given the significance of the economic crisis and the failed promise of President 
Hollande to significantly reduce mass unemployment in France, it came as no 
surprise that economic issues and the role of Europe as part of the solution or the 
                                                        
6 ‘Give France its national sovereignty back. Towards a Europe of independent nations, at the 
service of people.’  
7 ‘monetary, legislative, territorial, economic’ 
8 ‘at the forefront of the fight for pursuing the European project.’ 
9 ‘have presented an exit from the European Union as a disruptive event which could give a voice 
back to the 'people’ against the 'system'’.  
9 
 
problem emerged at the centre of the presidential campaign. Two economic 
questions emerging from domestic discontent but looking for a solution at 
European level came to the fore: fiscal and social dumping and Economic 
Monetary Union governance.  
 
Fiscal and social dumping matters federate the feeling that the EU is the problem 
and not the solution, particularly for those who are the 'left behind' of 
globalisation or what Guilluy (2014) calls 'La France périphérique'. A whole fringe 
of people who voted for Le Pen, east of a line running from Le Havre to Marseille, 
find themselves in struggling rural or peri-urban areas with high levels of 
unemployment and disappearing public services. The European issue which 
crystallised the most the idea that Europe is part of the problem and cannot be the 
solution at a social level is the Bolkestein directive regarding detached workers. It 
aims at creating a single market of services and allows to use workers from 
another EU country, usually a Central or Eastern European member state, and pay 
them the wage of that country while complying with the social legislation of that 
country as well. This directive has been the source of many instances of social 
dumping which has been primarily felt in France by working class and middle 
class voters. As a result, Le Pen and Mélenchon both argued that the directive 
should not be implemented in France anymore. Le Pen argued that it was creating 
‘une concurrence déloyale inadmissible’10 while Mélenchon considered that ‘la 
législation nationale doit s’appliquer totalement, y compris concernant les 
cotisations sociales patronales et salariales.’11 (Le Monde, 2017) Even Fillon and 
Hamon who came from two different economic perspective agreed that the 
directive had to be radically overhauled. Fillon went as far as considering that its 
implementation on French soil should be suspended if its amendment did not see 
the light of day before the end of 2017. On this particular issue, the strong pro-
European Macron also took the approach that the rules for sending detached 
workers should be revised at European level and in particular they could only be 
sent for a maximum of 12 months. This overwhelming consensus of all candidates 
on the identification of a problem affecting many French workers and stemming 
from European regulation, highlights the level of politicisation of the issue of 
Europe in the 2017 presidential campaign.  
 
In the same vein, the campaign involved many discussions on the future of the 
EMU and its governance. This issue of concern came from the fallout of the 
economic crisis as it was interpreted in France and was not grounded in other 
countries’ debate. The populist Eurosceptics, Le Pen and Mélenchon, blamed the 
Euro for France’s unemployment through delocalisation, anaemic economic 
growth and public deficit and called for radical solutions. Le Pen originally wanted 
France to drop the Euro and return to the Franc, her right-hand man Philippot 
having famously said that 70% of the manifesto could not be implemented if the 
Euro was kept (Albertini, 2017). However, in seeking an alliance with Debout la 
France, the first alliance the Front National ever managed to strike, she was forced 
by its leader Dupont-Aignan to drop the exiting of the Euro and reconsider a dual 
currency system with the Franc for internal exchanges and the Euro for external 
                                                        
10 ‘Inadmissible unfair competition’ 
11 ‘National legislation must apply fully, including with regards social contributions by employers 
and employees.’ 
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ones. This ended up costing her in focusing the attention on a key aspect of her 
manifesto which she struggled to defend in particular during the televised debate 
with Macron in between the two rounds. Mélenchon evolved during the campaign 
about abandoning the Euro. Some of his suggestions of renegotiation of the 
European treaties involve ending the independence of the European Central Bank 
which is simply unimaginable at the European level due to the German opposition. 
Facing the populists, Macron, Hamon and Fillon all considered that the governance 
of the Eurozone should be reformed. Fillon focused on the creation of an ad hoc 
political executive composed of Heads of State and Government meeting every 
three months and a ‘Secrétariat Général de la zone Euro – complètement 
indépendant de la Commission européenne’12 (Fillon, 2017). Macron and Hamon 
leaned more towards the lack of democratic representation when it came to the 
Eurozone and called for the setting up of a specific Parliament dealing with the 
Eurozone. Macron further campaigned for a budget and a Finance Minister for the 
Eurozone, which once elected Merkel publicly declared was a possibility (Le 
Parisien, 2017).  
 
In a climate of violent Germanophobia fuelled by Le Pen on one side and 
Mélenchon on the other, both arguing that France was being subservient to 
Germany and Merkel was de facto in charge of the country, it is particularly 
noteworthy to point out that Macron from the start of his campaign insisted that 
further European integration would be key to the development of France and that 
at the heart of this laid the Franco-German duo. With those key socio-economic 
issues at the heart of the campaign in a context of post economic crisis and slow 
recovery, the candidates attempted to shape the debate at the European level. The 
issue of an economic government had been on the cards since the creation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 1997 but had systematically been rejected by the 
Germans in particular. During the 2012 presidential campaign, Hollande ‘made a 
firm pledge to ‘renegotiate’ the Fiscal Compact Treaty negotiated by Sarkozy and 
Merkel in December 2011’ (Drake, 2013, p. 229). He was partly successful with 
the Compact for Growth and Jobs being agreed at the European Council in June 
2012. However tensions with Germany over France’s inability to bring its public 
deficit below 3% of GDP continued after the ratification of the Fiscal Compact. 
Given the level of Germanophobia expressed during the French presidential 
campaign as well as Macron’s strong signals towards a rekindled strong 
Franco/German relationship, Germany also indicated its openness to EU level 
policy and institutional changes as wanted by Macron. The 2017 presidential 
election with its strong pro/anti Europe line of cleavage was seen as a window of 
opportunity by the candidates to influence the European agenda.  
 
 
Conclusion: What is the future of Europe in the French political debate?  
 
Since 1992 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, France has seen the level 
of Euroscepticism slowly rise and infuse every single electoral campaign. 
However, the issue of Europe remained ‘the elephant in the room’ during each of 
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those presidential campaigns, often used as the undercover argument for every 
problem France was facing. The 2017 French presidential campaign however 
marked a new step in the Europeanisation of French elections for three reasons.  
 
Firstly, the traditional left/right cleavage which forged French political life and 
explains the existence of the ‘quadrille bipolaire’ as coined by Duverger was 
heavily challenged. The line of fracture was between the ones in favour of an open, 
Europeanised and globalised France versus those wanting a closed, outside of the 
EU and protectionist France. Even if the left/right cleavage has not disappeared, it 
certainly did not constitute the main explanation for understanding the 
positioning of candidates such as Mélenchon and Le Pen as opposed to Macron 
and Fillon. The 2017 presidential election will remain as the most Europeanised 
French election because of this level of politicisation rather than ‘elephant in the 
room’ approach. Citizens were asked to vote according to where they thought 
France should position itself in Europe – at the heart of it as a motor of integration 
with the Germans, at the fringes or outside.  
 
Secondly, the politicisation of the issue of Europe was focused on socio-economic 
matters rather than value or identity. Macron won the 2017 presidential election 
on a clear and daring pro-European platform. The French voters did not want any 
of the traditional parties in power again and took a gamble on a non-party 
candidate whose movement En Marche! did not exist 15 months prior to the 
election. Macron constituted the response to populist Euroscepticism and was 
given a cautious chance by the electorate, demonstrated by relatively lower levels 
of participation compared with previous presidential elections. He is clearly faced 
with an obligation of result on economic issues. His success or failure will 
determine whether French citizens, who have felt left behind by this neo-liberal 
European construction happening away from their control, can reconsider the 
impact that Europe has on France. 
 
Finally, all European countries have seen the rise to power or close to power of 
populist Eurosceptic political parties. Europe breathed a sigh of relief when 
Macron was elected. However, more than just relief, the French presidential 
election symbolised the political gain that can be had by pushing a pro-European, 
reformist and social agenda. This could also emulate in other European countries 
and forge the way forward towards a more citizens-oriented European 
integration.  
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